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Abstract: To displace fossil fuels and achieve the global greenhouse-gas emissions reductions required
to meet the Paris Agreement on climate change, the prevalent argument is that a mix of different
low-carbon energy sources will need to be deployed. Here we seek to challenge that viewpoint.
We argue that a completely decarbonized, energy-rich and sustainable future could be achieved
with a dominant deployment of next-generation nuclear fission and associated technologies for
synthesizing liquid fuels and recycling waste. By contrast, non-dispatchable energy sources like
wind and solar energy are arguably superfluous, other than for niche applications, and run the
risk of diverting resources away from viable and holistic solutions. For instance, the pairing of
variable renewables with natural-gas backup fails to address many of the entrenched problems
we seek to solve. Our conclusion is that, given the urgent time frame and massive extent of
the energy-replacement challenge, half-measures that distract from or stymie effective policy and
infrastructure investment should be avoided.
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1. Introduction
It is perceived wisdom that the world’s future energy supply must come from a diverse mix
of sources. In particular, supply from a mix of electricity generation sources is a key component
of the “Energy Trilemma Index” [1]. This need for a “future energy mix” is a fundamental and
essentially unchallenged axiom (or at least an unstated assumption) for energy experts [2,3], politicians,
environmental advocacy groups, integrated assessment modellers [4] and authoritative organizations
such as the Energy Information Administration [5], the International Energy Agency [6] and the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [7]. Energy-supply scenarios produced by these groups are of
two general types: “no climate policy” scenarios (often but inaccurately, referred to as “business-as-usual”;
BAU) and “stabilization” (greenhouse-gas emissions mitigation) pathways, with the latter invariably
comprised of a mix of energy technologies.
Scenario development typically begins with a projection of overall energy growth under the
assumption of no new policies beyond those already implemented, based on population and
economic forecasts, coupled with estimates of future technology changes (e.g., [8]), cast forward
20–100 years. Then mitigation scenarios are spun off from this by assuming various mitigation policies
are implemented over coming decades, often optimizing the choice of policies on the basis of cost
effectiveness. The scenarios are partitioned in some way among energy sources (fossil, nuclear and
renewable) and the effects of changes in end-use efficiency and conservation measures. The actual
proportions represented by these three broad classes of energy supply and demand management
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depends on the objectives of the modelling but some measure of economic, environmental, scientific
and socio-political considerations inevitably exert an influence on the character and assumptions of
the exercise and thus on the outcome.
Depending on how the modellers weight these factors, the range of possible modelling
assumptions and options is almost infinite [9,10]. Some scenarios (e.g., [11–14]) define arbitrary
mitigation “wedges” based on a cursory evaluation of the feasibility of their technical, economic and
logistic underpinnings [15] and often ignoring the fact that a substantial fraction of the suggested
wedge technologies is likely to be implemented spontaneously, even in the absence of policies [10].
Others more rigorously attempt to weigh a multitude of limiting factors, such as past experience,
technological maturity and development pathways, current and projected costs including associated
financial risks, fuel availability and security, material use, generation reliability, dispatchability, current
political policies and so on [3,4,16,17]. A problem with this “mechanistic” approach, however, is that,
historically, forecasts of this kind have usually born little resemblance to what actually eventuated over
subsequent decades [15,18,19]. In their recently published papers, Jacobson et al. [20,21] and others [22]
argue that the entire energy demand of the United States, including transport, heat and electricity,
can be supplied entirely by intermittent renewable energy sources (principally wind, solar and hydro).
However, their arguments have faced strong criticism by a number of energy researchers [23–25] in
regard to their assumptions and modelling methods.
The scenarios used by authoritative bodies like the International Energy Agency and Energy
Information Administration tend to be quite conservative, projecting only gradual and incremental
changes in energy sources. In particular, the forecast global energy pie in coming decades continues
to have large slices of coal, oil and gas. In addition, they often have an ambitious outlook for new
fossil-fuel technologies (such as carbon-capture-and sequestration) when stabilization scenarios are
modelled but with only small portions of nuclear and hydro and growing but persistently minor
roles for wind, solar and other non-hydro renewables. The time course of deviations from the current
energy mix in these stabilization scenarios is tortuously slow, which is surprising given the urgency
of mitigating the rise in global temperature and its consequences [22]. In short, the forecasts of these
energy agencies could certainly never be characterized as visions of the possibly radical and wholesale
transformation in our energy systems that many think will be necessary to reduce the probability of
dangerous anthropogenic interference (DAI) with the climate system to acceptable levels [26].
Yet, given the combination of “wicked problems” [27] that must be faced and conquered
by humanity this century, including global climate change, ocean acidification, biodiversity loss
and provision of adequate necessities for a human population that will soon approach 10 billion,
a business-as-usual or conservatively incremental mitigation approach may well not be a viable or
acceptable socio-political strategy. Indeed, if we continue to rely on fossil fuels for energy and fail
to practice stewardship of the Earth System, many of the incredible advances and benefits won by
modern civilization over the last few centuries may be severely degraded or lost. A future energy
system that delivers substantial and timely mitigation of carbon and other greenhouse-gas emissions,
while providing abundant energy for human development, is essential [28,29].
2. Alternative Energy Mixes and the “Silver Buckshot”
But how do we achieve the emissions reductions required to avoid DAI? (Or as Prins and Rayner
put it, “fire the ‘silver buckshot’”; [30]) Or is there a silver bullet after all? In this and the following
sections, we argue that balanced and diverse “energy mixes” are probably unnecessary, or at least
suboptimal, and that a completely decarbonized, energy-rich and sustainable future could be achieved
through the timely deployment of next-generation nuclear energy and associated technologies for
synfuel production and materials recycling alone. We acknowledge that this proposition is a radical
one but the time for subtleties has long passed. What global society now needs is a workable and
holistic “prescription for the planet” [31].
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The most widely discussed pathways for an alternative energy future involve the massively
expanded deployment of a wide range of “renewable” technologies, including harnessing the energy
in wind, sunlight, ocean waves and tides, as well as more traditional (and dispatchable—electricity
generation sources that can be generated at any time at the request of electricity network operators or
demand) hydropower and biomass combustion. Most advocates of these energy technologies shun
any use of nuclear power [13,32–34] and the majority of those who acknowledge its role view it as
simply (a small) part of the low-carbon energy jigsaw puzzle [35]. Some argue that an all-out pursuit
of a diverse mix of systems that harness sunlight, wind, waves and plant life at continental scales,
combined with vast improvements in energy efficiency and energy conservation for both production
and consumption sides and cheap energy storage, are “the answer” for global decarbonization. In some
published scenarios, arbitrary allocations of wind, water and sunlight are accumulated to reach a
total target energy supply [11–13]. In other modelled futures, attempts are made to balance electricity
demand with supply at all times, using gas (bio or fossil), hydro, stored heat and dispersed “supergrids”
to try to cover shortfalls [16,36–39].
Given these ideas, what is stopping nations from following through with these visions to
replace coal, oil and gas infrastructure with renewable energy? It is probably not because of any
strong, society-wide opposition to a switch to renewables, but, rather, a combination of economic
uncertainty, the undeniably diffuse and intermittent nature of the energy sources themselves,
technological immaturity and prudent financial risk management [3,40,41]. A key factor, therefore, is
that economically harnessing renewable energy such that it provides a reliable, dispatch-on-demand
power supply, still faces many technical challenges [15,17,41–43], not the least of which include the
laws of physics, in terms of energy density.
The highly diffuse nature of all the energy sources described above means that they require
the exploitation of extensive geographical areas to capture large amounts of energy. In some
favourable locations like Australia (with high solar insolation and low population density), this
is not, in itself, a major problem. For other countries, like Japan, South Korea or most European
nations with high population density, however, this presents a severe constraint [44]. Transmission
requirements also present problems arising from cost of transmission lines and power losses over long
distances [45]. Another difficulty is that the technosolar energy sources are inherently variable and
intermittent—sometimes they deliver a lot of power and sometimes little or none, for short or extended
periods [24,45,46]. This means that to satisfy the needs of an “always on” power demand, even with a
multi-source interconnected distributed network, ways must be found to store vast amounts of heat
or electricity to cover the non-generating periods [47], or else keep fossil-fuel or nuclear plants as a
backup [17,45,48]. It is in the local-to-transnational scaling up process that technical difficulties, costs
and time-scales amplify [18].
The problem of short-term intermittency (days to a week) for individual households (or a
local area) can be solved by improving energy storage systems (e.g., battery banks like the Tesla
Powerwall; [49–51]) and establishing proper economic mechanisms to encourage deployment [52].
However, for a country level in places such as the United Kingdom, where the seasonal energy
demand between winter (4.5 TWh day−1) and summer (1.5 TWh day−1) varies significantly [53],
the current capacity (technical, economic and volumetric) of energy storage dictates that it cannot play
an important role in reducing seasonal peak demand: as such, gas will remain as a major source of
peak electricity supply and heat [54].
Usually, scenarios that include a large-scale expansion of renewable energy also assume a
massive increase in the efficiency of energy consumption and fossil-fuel-derived production, leading to
substantially lower demand profiles than present systems [4,37,55]. The desirability of becoming more
efficient at how we generate and use energy is self-evident. Yet, in the broader context, to envisage that
the global human enterprise will use less energy per capita in the future through the overwhelming
success of end-use efficiencies, is contrary to the ongoing 21st-century trend of rapid economic
development in non-OECD countries and in the context of a still energy-starved developing world,
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largely irrelevant [18,19]. A few studies have shown that economic growth will increase energy
demand, or vice versa, with the history of energy use being characterized by the quest for ever cheaper
sources that provide higher and higher “power densities” [41]. We need to work with, not against,
these realities and seek to deliver these aspirations in an environmentally sustainable way.
Indeed, recent peer-reviewed critiques of the future global role of renewable energy [22,24,41,43]
provide exhaustive details on the constraints imposed by variability, dispatchability, large-scale
energy storage, the need for overbuilding and geographical replication (and the likely consequence:
“dumping” of unused excess energy), low energy returned on energy invested and other key points.
There are also recent meta-reviews that consider technological maturity, fit-for-service replacement
capacity, cost and life-cycle emissions, as constraints on renewables capacity to displace fossil
fuels [7,41,56]. The stark conclusion from these studies is that renewables alone will never be able to
solve the greenhouse problem. Ironically, empirical studies found that a policy attempt at expanding
renewables might not even reduce coal-based electricity and embedded greenhouse-gas emissions
(e.g., [57]). Ultimately, as the urgency of climate change mitigation mounts and as requirements
for sustainable growth in developing economies and the replacement of aging infrastructure in the
developed world come to the fore, pragmatic decisions on the economic and logistical viability of
all types of non-fossil technologies will have to be made rationally and with consideration to their
respective benefits and limitations [58].
3. Integral Fast Reactors—An Exemplar “Silver Bullet” Clean-Energy Technology
An exemplar of the idea of an energy “silver bullet” (a single energy source that could
potentially meet all of civilization’s needs), as opposed to the “silver buckshot” discussed above,
is fourth-generation nuclear energy. It has all of the crucial attributions required of a clean-energy
“techno-fix”, in that: (i) it offers the feasible prospect of a “plug in” replacement for coal- and gas-fired
electricity; (ii) its process heat or excess electrical output can be used for synfuel manufacture and
other industrial applications to replace oil; and (iii) this next generation of nuclear power systems
avoids many of the real and perceived problems of current-generation reactor technology [31,58–61].
But is there not a danger of “putting all of our (energy) eggs in one basket”? Certainly, the path to
an energy future that is dominated by advanced nuclear fission would have to overcome some major
challenges and solve the most significant problems and perceptions of nuclear power systems in use
today. The legacy of long-lived “nuclear waste” is one of the first objections to nuclear power that
one hears in any public discussion [62]. Safety is likewise prominent, especially in the wake of the
Fukushima crisis of 2011. Concerns regarding weapons proliferation risk, construction times and cost
and the assurance of a fuel supply that will last into the future, are also frequently expressed [2,48].
These apprehensions are not new. Indeed, a group of scientists at the U.S. Argonne National
Laboratory West (now Idaho National Laboratory) considered these same issues in the early 1980s and
reasoned that if the world was to have any hope of continued and increasing utilization of the energy
locked in the atom, all of these problem areas would have to be addressed and solutions to all of them
would have to be found. No stone was to be left unturned, no loose ends left for others to deal with in
the future [61]. The result of this decade-long project at America’s premier nuclear research centre was
the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) that solves virtually all the serious problems of nuclear power [61,63].
Just as the final stage of the project was to be demonstrated, however, it was cut short by a purely
political decision that eliminated the funding and shut down the program [31,61,64].
In response, in 2001, nine nations formed the Generation IV International Forum to develop
sustainable, economic, safe, reliable, proliferation resistant and physically protected nuclear
reactors [65]. Founding countries of the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) include Argentina,
Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of South Africa, the United Kingdom
and the United States. Subsequently, Switzerland in 2002, Euratom in 2003, the People’s Republic of
China and the Russian Federation in 2006 and Australia in 2016 signed the GIF Charter to become
member countries.
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The IFR is a development of existing Generation IV reactor systems and experiments in France,
Russia and Japan that improves the reactor technology, which links the fast reactor to on-site
reprocessing and fuel fabrication components (hence “integral”). It is an elegant solution to the
world’s energy problems and is a system that has been proven capable of eventually providing not just a
slice of the energy pie but the whole pie [60,66]. The IFR can utilize nuclear waste and weapons-grade
plutonium and uranium for fuel. A fleet of IFRs could consume both the spent nuclear fuel and the
vast inventories of depleted uranium that have resulted from over half a century of nuclear power
and weapons programs, for electricity and heat production. The IFR is ultimately capable of using
over 99% of the potential energy in uranium and plutonium, via repeated recycling of the used fuel,
which means that the existing material that we already have at our disposal could supply all the
energy humanity is expected to require for many centuries [67] and more potential IFR fuel will be
produced until the point when conventional thermal reactors are no longer used. The IFR achieves
this via electrometallurgical pyroprocessing, in which the actinides in spent nuclear fuel are recycled
without the need for further mining or enrichment of uranium [61].
Compared with the complicated and relatively expensive fuel fabrication processes for current-day
reactors (i.e., generation II and III nuclear reactors) [67], the revolutionary pyroprocessing system used
to recycle IFR fuel (and convert used ceramic oxide fuel from light-water reactors), along with the
injection-casting method for manufacturing metal-fuel pins that are held within the cladding using
a liquid-sodium bond, is remarkably simple, with a small-footprint fuel recycling and fabrication
facility to service a plant hosting (e.g.,) four PRISM reactor modules [68]. During the decades-long
IFR project, over 30,000 fuel pins were recycled for the EBR-II fast reactor [63]. Further, because
pyroprocessing never isolates any actinide elements or isotopes capable of being used in weapons
systems, the technology is inherently proliferation-resistant: indeed, at every stage of the fuel cycle,
the fuel is too radioactively “hot” to handle. (In other words, additional [and extremely technically
challenging] chemical re-processing using specialized radioactive-protected facilities would still be
required to potentially purify IFR material sufficiently for use as weapons-grade fissile actinides).
However, this ultimately has little to do with defending the objectives of this paper, because centralized
pyroprocessing/fuel fabrication facilities could be established in Nuclear Weapon States that would
cater to the needs of all others by supplying them with nuclear fuel as individual items, i.e., ready fuel
elements, or fuel assemblies [69].
The safety of nuclear power plants is one of the foremost expressed concerns of anti-nuclear
groups. Following the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, four reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant were damaged, with three cores suffering a meltdown. However, no fatalities
directly related to radiation exposure of the accident were reported [70], and the potential future health
effects due to the radiation exposure is forecast to remain negligible [71]. The inherent safety features of
the IFR prevent any Fukushima-like accident from loss of cooling occurring. The passive safety features
of this design allow for shutting the nuclear reactor down without external power sources or human
intervention, as demonstrated in a landmark set of tests in 1986 [72]. Although sodium-cooled fast
reactors raised public concerns of a sodium reaction with air leading to a potential fire [73], there are
other types of Generation IV reactor that avoid such incidents; including lead and lead-bismuth cooled
reactors, liquid salt cooled reactors and thermal- or even fast-spectrum molten-salt reactors [65].
The objection that nuclear power plants take too long to build and are far too expensive does not
hold up to logic if one considers well-known principles of engineering and systems fabrication. For one
thing, General Electric’s Advanced Boiling Water Reactors (ABWRs) have recently demonstrated that
modern nuclear power systems can be built both economically and quickly. The first two ABWRs
were built in Japan in the 1990s, taking 36 and 39 months to build, even though complex first-of-a-kind
systems usually take longer to build than subsequent copies. Studies relying on limited and outdated
data from the US and France, which mainly built reactors before 1990, concluded that the construction
costs of nuclear power have dramatically increased (e.g., [74,75]). However, a recent study that
overviewed the construction costs of 349 nuclear power plants argues that the countries currently
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building nuclear reactors actively are experiencing stabilized costs (at around US$2000 per kWe
(2010 dollars) in India) or reducing construction costs (US$4000 to 2000 per kWe in South Korea) due
to standardized designs and appropriate regulations [76].
In contrast to these recent light-water-reactor projects, the General Electric-Hitachi PRISM
(Power Reactor Innovative Small Module)—the blueprint of a commercial design for an IFR reactor—is an
entirely modular system, with components that can be mass-produced in factories and trucked or shipped
to the power plant site [77]. The diameter of the reactor vessel of the PRISM IFR (nameplate capacity
of 311 MWe, though capable of 380 MWe) is about 10 m, compared with ~6 m for a large wind turbine
with a nameplate capacity of 3 MWe [78]. The simplicity of the IFR design—due in no small part to
the fact that it operates at atmospheric pressure—leads it to require far fewer pumps, valves and other
control systems than any other nuclear plants in use or under construction today. In such manufacturing,
simplified systems with fewer parts that are capable of utilizing mass-production end up costing less [79].
First-of-a-kind commercial PRISM (and similar) reactors are expected to be >15% (maximum 55%) more
expensive compared with subsequent reactors [80]. Deploying the Generation III+ reactors designed with
the enhanced safety systems could reduce the uncertainty and risk to the first buyers by demonstrating
the maturity of passive safety systems.
How might the IFR scale up as a “silver bullet”? This can most certainly be done at a far faster
rate than France converted their country to nuclear generation, considering that they evinced no
great sense of urgency and were building far more complex, non-modular systems. France was
able to shift from approximately <20–80% nuclear electricity in just 11 years [58] and Sweden had
similar success with a mix of nuclear and hydro [81,82]. For another comparison, being a simple
and replicable design, the factory production of IFR PRISMs would be of comparable complexity to
building heavy bombers during World War II. In 1944–1945, the United States alone built 22,915 heavy
and superfortress bombers, without the aid of automated welding technology and other robotics [83].
About 7700 × 311 MWe PRISMs would be required to produce as much electricity as the entire world
produced from all sources in 2012. (See Supplementary Information for a more detailed analysis on
the IFR deployment rate required to meet the Paris Agreement climate targets.) When it comes to both
rapid mass production and cost reduction, a critical advantage of fast reactors is that they operate at
or very near atmospheric pressure, thus avoiding the industrial bottleneck of having to build robust
pressure vessels, while having the advantage of the inherent safety of low-pressure operation. When
these advantages are combined with small modular design, it portends a transformative future for
nuclear power that opens the door for virtually any developed country to switch to nuclear power
as its primary power source in less than a decade. Political will, not safety or economics, will be the
limiting factor.
For total electricity replacement with the IFR, however, we would need a generating capacity
(currently met primarily by today’s fossil fuel plants) that is capable of meeting not only baseload
requirements but also peak demand. The IFR, because of its potential load-following capability, can
provide both. Then, once all today’s fossil fuel generating capacity is converted to IFRs, we would
have a system capable of meeting all facets of demand based on a technology that is able to operate
constantly at full power (unlike variable renewables) and for which the fuel is essentially free—for
centuries. Given that peak demand is typically two to three times greater than average demand
(depending on location, season, industrial versus residential use, etc.), IFR technology can produce
what is essentially “free” excess energy, which could be used to produce hydrogen either via electrolysis
or, more efficiently, via direct heat in catalytic reactions [84]. Mixed with carbon dioxide (captured and
stored from burning fossil fuels, or absorbed from the atmosphere [85]) or nitrogen, that hydrogen
can be used to fabricate virtually any of the liquid fuels we use today, including gasoline and jet
fuel, butanol, methanol, ammonia, etc. [86,87] or more exotic energy-storage media based on refined
metals [31,88]. Advanced energy storage integrated with IFRs will provide greater flexibility of the
reactor operation and higher energy efficiency that can replace the use of “backup” open-cycle gas
generation entirely [89].
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In addition, we could deploy desalination projects [90] on a hitherto unimagined scale (and the
necessary pipeline and canal systems to get the water to where it would be needed). This capability is
an important co-benefit of IFR technology, vital for providing domestic and agricultural water needs
for a world expected to house billions more people by mid-century [91,92]. The Ras Al-Khair plant,
which is operated in Saudi Arabia, has a production capacity of 2400 MWe of electricity from gas and
1 million m3 of desalinated water a day [93,94]. Excess energy can also power plasma-arc torches to
transform solid waste streams into syngas and other products for efficient recycling of virtually any
waste materials [31,95].
What role would the “buckshot” of solar and wind power technologies play in such a “silver
bullet” IFR-dominated future? For impassioned advocates of those systems, the inconvenient truth is
that, beyond niche roles, they would be merely expensive redundancies, for all the energy humanity
demands could readily be met by advanced nuclear power. We can be certain that the opposite dynamic
will not apply—wind and solar will not make nuclear or fossil fuels redundant [96]. It is misleading to
talk about wind or solar with utility-scale “backup” when, operating at capacity factors of 15–35%,
they produce far less usable energy than the natural gas, hydro, coal, nuclear or biofuels that are used
to cover for them.
Those who oppose a major role for nuclear in a low-carbon energy future often complain about
the opportunity cost against non-hydro renewables when nations choose to invest in nuclear power
plants [34]. This position, as we can see, is as inverted as their use of the term “backup”. In fact,
society arguably loses out when money is allocated to wind and solar projects, considering that those
funds could instead be used to build IFRs that operate constantly with high reliability, are able to
supply all the energy we want without emitting any carbon dioxide or other pollutants and, in the
process, make wind and solar installations as obsolete as fossil fuels. This is an inconvenient energy
truth and possibly one reason why advocates of renewables are often so zealous in their antagonism
toward nuclear power. The transition to an IFR world would, furthermore, eliminate the need for the
development of inefficient and costly battery storage.
4. Unconventional Fossil Future?
There is another scenario that many policy experts, technologists and economists think is plausible:
a modification (but not replacement) of the “business-as-usual” fossil-fuel-dominated energy portfolio.
This is a future where not only are huge quantities of coal still burned for baseload electricity but also
where oil-dominated industries such as transportation, agriculture and many industrial processes
are projected to switch to a reliance on natural gas, driven by low-cost methane that shoulders
out supposedly more expensive nuclear and renewable alternatives [97]. In these scenarios, most
of the new gas comes from “unconventional” sources such as fractured shales, coal-bed methane,
tight sands, and, more speculatively, underground gasified coal and ocean hydrates. The potential
resources are undeniably enormous [6], if they can be tapped economically and (more importantly) if
environmental concerns are subordinated. Over the last decade, new technology has allowed cheaper
and more efficient extraction of “fracked gas,” leading to a glut in supply, low prices and speculation
of “centuries” of extractable resources [98]—enough to permit a gradual and measured transition
to eventual fossil-fuel-free “alternatives”. Gas, it is argued, is a clean burning and “low-carbon”
fuel [99,100] and, if tight CO2-emission controls are needed, then carbon-capture-and-sequestration
(CCS) technology can be scaled up to reduce carbon footprints even further [101]. While gas is a
low-CO2 emitting fuel relative to coal, as explained further below, it is not necessarily a climate-friendly
fuel, because there will always be leakage of methane (a much more powerful greenhouse-gas than
CO2) at different stages of the production-to-use cycle and because the attendant reduction in SO2
emissions will lead to additional warming [102].
From a certain limited perspective, the reasoning seems sound. Gas-fired power plants are
cheap to build and while the fuel is abundant, they are also relatively cost-effective to operate.
Open-cycle gas turbines are ideal for load following, combined-cycle gas plants are efficient baseload
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electricity providers and liquefied natural gas is a useable substitute for many refined petroleum
products [98,99,101]. Further, the investment risk for new gas-fired power plants is low, since the
public is relatively indifferent to their construction and they can be built quickly. The technology for
CCS has been demonstrated at small scales, such as in enhanced-oil-recovery operations and analysis
suggests that its additional cost could be supported by a carbon price of about $50 per ton of CO2
emitted [41]. Given these realities and the current political and economic landscape that has allowed
huge multinational oil and gas companies to exert a massive influence on energy decision making [31],
it would seem that a massive expansion of new nuclear power, as outlined in the previous section,
is implausible.
But how secure are these “realities” in the medium- to long-term? Some facts, like the low capital
cost and operational flexibility of gas-fired power plants and current political favouritism, are beyond
dispute. Others are not so certain [103]. For instance, although the gas production rates from fracking
are high initially, data from longer-term operations suggests that the decline rates are much faster than
in conventional wells [104,105]. This has potentially serious economic implications for any energy
system predicated on high gas use and will ultimately dictate what reserves end up being tapped and
what resources stay in the ground (and for how long). The claim of “centuries of supply” relies heavily
on the ongoing cost competitiveness of methane supply being greater than the upfront capital costs of
alternatives like new nuclear, with its forever-miniscule fuel costs [67].
The climate-change arguments against a gas-dominated energy future are arguably even more
limiting. When burned in a flexible mix of combined-cycle baseload gas and open-cycle peaking plants,
the greenhouse gas emission of methane fuel is ~450 kg CO2e/kWh [41]. When one also accounts for the
reduction in sulphate aerosol dimming caused by switching away from coal combustion [102], and the
leakage of methane (a more powerful, albeit shorter-lived climate-forcing agent than carbon dioxide)
across the whole production and transportation cycle, the value of natural gas for substantial abatement
of greenhouse-gas-induced radiative forcing is dubious at best [106]. For instance, Wigley used
MAGICC simulations (Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change; [107])
to show that, under a scenario of a 50% reduction in coal and a corresponding increase in natural gas
use, global warming by the year 2100 would be reduced by only 0.1 ◦C if leakage were kept to 2%,
or about 0.2 ◦C with no leaks. In a high methane-leakage-rate scenario of 10%, warming would not be
reduced until 2140—far too late to avoid major disruptions to the climate system. A similar result was
found in a modelling study by Myhrvold and Caldeira [108].
5. More Silver Bullets
While IFR technology, as described above, is perfectly capable of providing all the energy
humanity needs for centuries, there is another nuclear technology that was developed and
demonstrated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the USA in the 1960s. This is the molten salt
reactor (MSR), in which fissile material is dissolved in molten salt, with no solid fuel assemblies.
Like the IFR, this project was unceremoniously shelved after being successfully demonstrated but
the concept has been resurrected in recent years and, now, several start-ups are seeking to deploy
this technology. Its high operating temperature (~700 ◦C versus ~500–550 ◦C for IFRs or 350 ◦C for
currently-deployed water reactors) promises greater efficiency and manifold possibilities for industrial
process heat, or replacement of coal burners at coal-fired power plants. While the high temperature,
corrosion potential of molten salt and embrittlement issues caused by neutron bombardment present
demanding materials challenges, there are MSR concepts that very plausibly address these issues,
with projected costs that promise to be even cheaper than IFRs (e.g., thorconpower.com). And, like
IFRs, these modular reactors operate at atmospheric pressure so that they can be mass produced in
great numbers.
When the IFR project was abruptly terminated as earlier described, it was in the final stage of
designing and demonstrating the pyroprocessing fuel recycling technology at commercial scale [61].
That design project languished until 2013, when Argonne National Laboratory resumed it with a
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broader objective: not only would the commercial-scale plant recycle metal IFR fuel but it would
also recycle spent oxide fuel from light water reactors, the so-called “nuclear waste” that is often
mischaracterized as a “million-year problem”. Fortuitously, that same pyroprocessing technology
can also recycle the spent fuel from molten salt reactors. It is, in effect, a one-size-fits-all nuclear fuel
recycling solution. Now, four years after restarting that project, the design is essentially finished and
could be built in the near future, at a reasonable cost, demonstrating a solution to the nuclear waste
problem and enabling both IFRs and molten salt reactors to be built in the knowledge that their spent
fuel will be efficiently recycled.
6. Conclusions
To displace fossil fuels and achieve deep global greenhouse-gas reductions, the quest for a
diversified “energy mix” is probably unnecessary and suboptimal. Certainly, energy use in the
industrial age to date has been dominated by only a few convenient carbon-rich forms—coal,
oil and gas. In this viewpoint, we have argued that the technology already exists to deliver a
completely decarbonized, energy-rich and sustainable civilization, via the extensive deployment
of next-generation nuclear power systems and associated equipment for synthesizing liquid fuels and
recycling waste. Importantly, this transition could be achieved without a major shift in the way our
modern economy functions and certainly without a large-scale regression in energy use or reliance on
future breakthroughs such as cheap and high-capacity energy-storage (a critical necessity if non-hydro
renewables are to have any prospect of providing a large-scale alternative to fossil fuels). A “natural gas
economy”, often touted as the bridge from coal to future renewables, does not solve the entrenched
environmental and supply problems that 21st-century civilization must seek to remedy and has limited
value as a “transitional fuel” because of its climate-forcing impact. Given the urgent time frame and
massive extent of the energy-replacement challenge [8], half-measures that distract from, or stymie,
effective policy and infrastructure investment, must be avoided.
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/2/302/
s1.
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